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Abstract 
 
 
We find evidence that U.S. auditors increased their attention to fraud detection during or 
immediately after the economic contractions of the 20th century, based on a content analysis of 
the 12 volumes of the 20th-century auditing reference series Montgomery’s Auditing.  
Contractions, however, do not seem to have affected auditors’ attention to the formal goal of 
fraud detection.  The study suggests that auditors’ aversion to the heightened risks of fraud 
during economic downturns leads them to focus more on fraud detection at those times 
regardless of the particular guidance in formal audit standards.  This study is the first to find 
some evidence of a recession-influenced difference between fraud detection practices and formal 
fraud detection goals. 
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Introduction 
 
The economic adversities that befell the country [in the Great Depression] laid bare or emphasized much 
in American business practice that is unsound and even reprehensible and there has been a general 
demand by investors, credit grantors, stock exchanges and regulatory bodies for increased scrutiny of the 
accounts of businesses by competent independent auditors with the purpose of preventing a recurrence of 
such unsound practices. 
- Robert Montgomery, 1934 
 
Business cycles affect many human behaviors, from birth rates (Sobotka et al., 2011) to 
elections (Fair 2002).  Do they also affect audit procedures?  Our data suggest the answer is yes.  
Specifically, we find some evidence that, during or just after the economic contractions of the 
20th century, U.S. auditors increased their attention to techniques designed to detect fraud.  
Contractions do not seem to be associated, however, with changes in auditors’ attention to formal 
fraud detection standards.  That is, hard economic times appear to affect audit procedures but not 
formal audit standards, at least in the short run. 
This research responds in part to recent prominent calls for more work on emerging 
issues in fraud research, particularly of a sort relevant to audits and fraud investigations (Brody 
et al., 2012).  The 2011-2012 AAA president, Gregory Waymire, chose the need for “innovation 
in accounting scholarship” as the strategic theme for his presidency (Waymire,  2012, p. 817), 
including research that is relevant to practice (McCarthy, 2012, pp. 834-845 and inter alia; see 
also Granof and Zeff, 2008, and Kaplan 2011; for an example of such research see Brazel, Jones, 
& Zimbelman, 2009).  Specifically, Kalbers (2009, p. 202) calls for “understanding of business 
cycles and peculiarities within certain industries [to] focus research on understanding contexts 
within which motivations for earnings management or fraud may be stronger or weaker.”  
Because fraud affects public confidence in entities as diverse as stock markets, auditors, bankers, 
corporate executives, and government (Sanders & Hamilton, 1997), auditors’ responsiveness to 
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fraud is both interesting and critical. 
We begin by laying out our argument in the context of prior literature on the coincidence 
of fraud and the business cycle, along with the relevance of loss aversion to auditor behavior.  
Next, we describe our method, variables, and data sources – the use of a content analysis of the 
audit reference series Montgomery’s Auditing1 (published in 12 volumes from 1912 to 1998), 
examined in relation to the contractions and expansions of the U.S. economy that occurred over 
the 20th century.  Finally, we report and discuss our results, including both our main finding that 
recessions appear to increase auditors’ attention to fraud detection techniques, as well as our 
finding that economic downturns do not seem to systematically affect the profession’s formal 
standards concerning a fraud detection responsibility.   
The Research Question in the Context of Prior Literature 
There is a small body of research indicating that fraud itself varies with the business 
cycle.  In a study of Italian crime reports from 1979 to 2004, Detotto and Otranto found that 
fraud reports increase during declines in GDP (2012).  They attribute the rise to an increase in 
the incentives for people to commit fraud during recessions.  Povel et al. (2007), however, 
believe fraud – especially financial statement fraud – occurs most often near the end of a boom, 
while the subsequent bust simply reveals it (p. 1219).  Kalbers (2009) agrees with the latter view, 
arguing that failing firms are likely to commit fraud in “pre-bankruptcy” years (p. 194) and that 
“fraudulent financial reporting increases during economic booms as managers attempt to match 
the accomplishments of other firms and as the bubble begins to become unsustainable” (p. 202). 
Povel et al. (2007) develop a model for fraud and the business cycle that views financial 
statement fraud as a function of investor incentives.  During booms, when investors are searching 
                                                
1 The bibliographic citations for all the Montgomery volumes used appear in the reference list.  The series had 
different names over the course of the 20th century.  For convenience, we refer to it by its common name, 
Montgomery’s Auditing, or just Montgomery.  
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for companies to fund and they expect to see generally good times, they will not insist on close 
monitoring of their investees’ reports – unless the reports show the firm is struggling.  This 
provides both the opportunity and the incentive for some managements to manipulate their 
financials fraudulently, especially when the end of a boom looms and weaker firms experience 
declining performance.  On the other hand, during an economic downturn, chastened investors 
demand closer monitoring of their investees, making financial statement fraud much riskier for 
companies (1221-1222). 
The public has considered the detection of fraud to be the main purpose of an audit for 
millennia (Clikeman, 2009, pp. 123-125; Gupta and Ray, 1992).  Historically, auditors have been 
markedly less enthusiastic (Clikeman, 2009; Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, 1978; 
Gray and Moussalli, 2006; Lee et al., 2009).  Indeed, they have at times actively opposed such a 
goal (Humphrey et al., 1993; Moussalli et al., 2012, p. 89).  
In a previous paper, we reported evidence that auditors varied their attention to both 
formal standards as well as techniques concerning fraud detection over the 20th century 
(Moussalli et al., 2011).  Explanations for these changes in attention to formal fraud detection 
goals typically focus on the history of the profession’s reactions to revelations of momentous 
financial statement frauds (Clikeman, 2009; Gray et al., 2006; Heier et al., 2005; Jaenicke, 1977; 
Lee et al., 2009; O’Reilly et al., 1990, pp. ix-x; Moussalli et al., 2012; Previts and Merino, 1998, 
pp. 367-378).  But good explanations for the variations in the concern for fraud detection 
techniques are lacking. 
The question for this paper is: Do auditors vary their attention to fraud detection – 
whether techniques or formal goals or both – in response to business cycles?  Anecdotally, they 
sometimes assert that they do. Practically, it would be reasonable for auditors’ interest in fraud 
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detection to be related to the business cycle if fraud itself is also related to booms and busts. 
Current professional standards in the United States require, in a few brief words, that 
auditors consider “general economic factors” and a situation of “increasing business failures” in 
the overall economy as risk factors (AS 12, paragraphs 7 and 9; AU 316.85 paragraph A2).  But 
it was not always so. During the 20th century, auditors sometimes eschewed fraud detection as a 
formal goal of the audit regardless of the business climate (National Commission, 1987).   
If economic downturns do in fact raise the risk of fraudulent misstatement and therefore 
the potential for audit failure, prospect decision theory would predict that auditors will be more 
attentive to fraud detection during hard economic times even in the absence of standards 
requiring such attention.  Prospect theory, introduced in 1979 by Kahneman and Tversky, and 
recently described as “the most successful behavioral model of decision-making under risk and 
uncertainty” (Tom et al., 2007), argues that people are more averse to the possibility of loss than 
they are attracted to the possibility of gain.  Subsequent studies have generally estimated 
people’s aversion to potential loss to be about twice as strong as their attraction to gain (Dickhaut 
et al., 2010, pp. 222, 243; Rabin, 2000, p. 1288; Tom et al., 2007, p. 515).  This aversion 
demonstrably affects decisions made under the threat of loss.  In light of the pervasive risks 
presented by economic downturns, we predict that prospect theory is right: auditors will be more 
attentive to fraud detection in a recession regardless of what they formally state they will do. 
At the same time, we argue that, in order to survive or legitimize their conduct, auditors 
will be more attentive to fraud detection because in a recession, when people become more 
critical of auditors’ role.  This phenomenon can be explained by legitimacy theory which 
suggests that organizations (including audit professional bodies) conform to the expectation of 
the society in which they operate (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Society confers legitimacy upon 
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organizations (including accounting and audit professional bodies), where legitimacy is defined 
as ‘‘a condition or status which exists when an entity’s value system is congruent with the value 
system of the larger social system of which the entity is a part” (Lindblom, 1993, p. 2). 
Organizational legitimacy is, therefore, a resource on which organizations depend for their 
existence or survival (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Organizational existence will be threatened or 
even eliminated if society withdraws its support.  For example, Arthur Andersen’s failure to meet 
societal expectations in the Enron case was perceived as so severe that the firm was eliminated 
(Carnegie and Napier, 2010).   
Hines (1989, 1991) argued that legitimacy was the critical resource when the US 
accounting profession developed a conceptual framework. She argued that a conceptual 
framework provided a “symbol of objectivity and professionalism”.  She added that conceptual 
frameworks provide a means of increasing the ability of a profession to self-regulate, thereby 
offsetting the likelihood that government intervention will occur.  Similarly, in this paper we 
argue that during economic downturns, there is widespread stakeholder or societal criticism that 
audit authorities fail to meet their obligations (Arnold and Sikka, 2001; Cooper & Catchpowle, 
2009) and in response to such criticism, auditors will change their audit procedures.  Such 
responsive behavior of auditors is consistent with legitimacy theory. 
Data Method and Variables2 
To investigate changes in U.S. auditors’ interest in fraud detection, we performed a 
detailed content analysis3 of the Montgomery’s Auditing series.   
Montgomery’s Auditing was published in 12 editions from 1912 to 1998.  As the standard 
reference work for the U.S. auditing profession during the 20th century (Commission, 1978, p. 
                                                
2 See table 1 for a list of variable definitions. 
3 See Hodson 1999 for a discussion of the content analysis method. 
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33), it has been used as primary source material in many prior historical studies (Brown, 1962; 
Chandler et al., 1993; Clikeman, 2009; Commission, 1978; Gray and Moussalli 2006; Hackett 
and Mobley, 1976; Heier et al., 2005; Moussalli et al, 2011, 2012; Myers, 1985; Nouri and 
Lombardi, 2006).   
Robert Montgomery was a founder of one of Price Waterhouse Cooper’s predecessor 
firms (Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery), a two-term president of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants’ predecessor organization, and a founder of the Journal of 
Accountancy.  He was one of the creators of the first U.S. authoritative standards of accounting 
and auditing in 1917 and the first income tax act in the 20th century (Zeff, 1987).  What 
Montgomery thought and wrote about auditing was considered authoritative.  He was the lead 
author of the Montgomery’s Auditing series, in collaboration with his colleagues, until his death 
in 1953.  His colleagues continued the work until the end of the century (Moussalli et al., 2011).  
Changes in the content of Montgomery’s Auditing are an imperfect proxy for changes in 
U.S. auditors’ attitudes.  However, Montgomery was a widely-used reference work and practical 
manual for practicing auditors (Commission, 1978, p. 33) in the United States during the 20th 
century.  We believe that it represented the views of the profession well enough to fairly measure 
broad changes in those views as well as in generally accepted auditing practices over the course 
of the 20th century. 
Our content analysis identified three variables in the Montgomery texts that are useful to 
this paper: the amount of text concerned with practice – that is, examples and guidance on fraud 
detection techniques, and two variables that in some way discuss the detection of fraud as a goal 
of the audit (see detailed descriptions below).   
We counted the words concerning these variables (twice for consistency) in each volume.  
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This required a lengthy manual scanning of every volume, since text referring to fraud detection 
often did not use the word “fraud” or its synonyms.  When a relevant section was identified, we 
counted the lines devoted to it and multiplied by the average words per line for that volume.  We 
controlled for the length of the individual volumes, which varied substantially over the century, 
by calculating each variable as a percentage of the total text in the volume.  The below three 
variables are our dependent variables:  
HOW TO DETECT: This variable is the percentage of the text explaining how the auditor 
should go about detecting fraud.  In 1916, for instance, Montgomery noted (p. 167) that the 
existence of unclaimed dividends made it wise to note “any payments out of the regular order …, 
as it may be found that unauthorized payments are being charged thereto”.  Such material was 
voluminous in comparison to the formal positions variables, described next.   
RESPONSIBLE: This variable is the percentage of the text explicitly asserting the 
auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud.  Included are direct statements such as this one from the 
first edition:  “The elementary or minor objects of an audit are: (1) The detection of fraud” (p. 
10).  Any discussion of legal responsibilities that clearly states or implies the author’s agreement, 
as well as text concerning the auditor’s responsibility for detecting and reporting illegal acts, are 
also included in this variable. 
3-POSITIONS: This variable is the total percentage of the text that 1) explicitly asserts 
the responsibility to detect fraud (i.e., the RESPONSIBLE variable), or 2) explicitly denies such a 
responsibility (e.g., the “auditor is not an insurer” and arguments for that position), or 3) 
discusses the goal of fraud detection in such an ambivalent or even euphemistic way that it was 
not possible to classify it as accepting or denying responsibility.   
The logic behind the 3-POSITIONS variable (which lumps together fraud detection 
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acceptance, denial, and ambivalence), is that there is a difference between editions that discuss 
fraud for any reason and those that largely ignore the subject.  We assume that discussion of any 
sort indicates a greater degree of interest or concern than does text that devotes little attention to 
the subject. 4 
The passages in Montgomery that we count in RESPONSIBLE are widely accepted in the 
literature as a valid measure of the American auditing profession’s formal stance on fraud 
detection (Brown, 1962; Chandler et al., 1993; Clikeman, 2009; Commission, 1978; Hackett and 
Mobley, 1976; Heier et al., 2005; Myers 1985; National Commission, 1987; Nouri and 
Lombardi, 2006).  The HOW TO DETECT variable, on the other hand, may not measure fraud 
detection practices so directly.  It might be argued, for instance, that authorial idiosyncrasies 
explain part of the variation in HOW TO DETECT.  In defense of our measure is Brown’s 1962 
observation that fraud detection was much more common in practice from 1940-1960 than the 
standards would indicate, an observation that our data for the 1949 and 1957 editions support.  
Furthermore, HOW TO DETECT measures what professional leaders thought students and 
practitioners should learn when they consulted their reference books; we believe it also reflects 
actual audit practice.  
The six independent variables (some of which are used solely to check the robustness of 
our results) represent the business cycle and are based on the National Bureau of Economic 
Research series for business cycles.5  This series lists the peak and trough months for every 
economic cycle from 1854 to the early 2000s.  Descriptions of these explanatory variables 
                                                
4 We are indebted to Frances Dunham, professor emeritus of psychology at the University of West Florida, for 
suggesting this part of the analysis. 
5 Economic cycle data are taken from www.nber.org/cycles.html.  At that site, the NBER defines a recession as “a 
significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally 
visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales.” 
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follow:  
CONTRACT24 is an independent variable that indicates decline in any month or months 
out of the 24 months prior to the year in which a volume was published.  This is an indicator 
variable coded 0 if no contraction occurred and 1 if a contraction did occur.  Our reasoning for 
this is that the Montgomery editions were written in some period of time before the year of 
publication.  If a recession occurred during or shortly before the writing of a volume, we believe 
it may have affected what was written about fraud detection.  The 1957, 1985, 1990, and 1998 
volumes were coded “0” by this definition, meaning that no downturn occurred within the 24 
months preceding the publication of any of those editions.  All of the other volumes were coded 
“1” (see table 2). 
%CONTRACT24 is the percentage of months of economic decline that occurred in the 24 
months prior to the year in which a volume was published.  This is an alternative definition of 
the CONTRACT24 variable for robustness purposes. We assumed that a longer recession might 
affect auditor behavior more than a short one; this variable might therefore capture an effect not 
apparent with the CONTRACT24 dummy variable. 
MAJORITY CONTRACT24: This is also a dummy variable, coded 0 if fewer than half of 
the 24 months prior to publication saw an economic decline and 1 if half or more of the months 
were contractions. This variable is also designed for robustness purposes. 
The other three independent variables are alternate measures based on 18 months before 
publication instead of 24: CONTRACT18, %CONTRACT18, and MAJORITY CONTRACT18. 
Once again, the idea is to make sure that our results are robust because of uncertainty about when 
the volumes were actually written.   
We predicted that all these independent variables would have a positive effect on the 
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attention paid to fraud detection in the Montgomery series.  However, we were unsure whether 
attention to both the techniques and the standards concerning fraud detection would be affected – 
hence the use of both HOW TO DETECT and the two formal positions variables, RESPONSIBLE 
and 3-POSITIONS.  And, as mentioned, we were uncertain about the timing of the contraction in 
relation to when the books were written, so we used both 24-month and 18-month variables.  
Model, Results, and Discussion 
As mentioned previously, our general question is if economic downturns explain auditor 
behavior. Our formal model is as follows: 
Text Mentioning Fraud Detection Techniques, Goals, or Both = f (Various Measures on 
Timing of Publication of Montgomery Volumes) 
The dependent variable, Text Mentioning Fraud Detection Techniques, Goals, or Both, is 
captured by HOW TO DETECT (for fraud detection techniques), and RESPONSIBLE and 3-
POSITIONS (for fraud detection goals), constructed out of the Montgomery volumes. The right-
hand side variables stand for various measures regarding the timing of the publications are 
CONTRACT24, %CONTRACT24, MAJORITY CONTRACT24, and, similarly defined, 
CONTRACT18, %CONTRACT18, and MAJORITY CONTRACT18.  
We have previously reported our descriptive findings for the three variables from 
Montgomery [citation suppressed].  Briefly, we found that the percentage of the Montgomery 
volumes asserting an auditor responsibility to detect fraud or discussing such a goal in any way 
plummeted between 1912 and 1916 (see fig. 1).  After 1916, 3-POSITIONS rose for most of the 
rest of the century, but it never again approached anything like the 1912 level. 
In other words, analysis of the Montgomery auditing series suggests that the U.S. 
profession began the 20th century with substantial avowals of its responsibility to detect fraud.  
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Almost immediately, though, the profession began strenuously avoiding the topic of fraud 
detection as an audit goal.  When the subject was brought up in later years, it was often presented 
in negative, ambivalent, or euphemistic ways, despite the fact that a formal goal of fraud 
detection appeared in official audit standards by the 1970s (American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants 1977). 
In contrast, an enormous amount of the early Montgomery volumes was devoted to the 
subject of how the auditor should go about detecting fraud (see fig. 2).  Subsequently the 
percentages fell dramatically, a fall that endured through the end of the century, when our data 
end.  Note that this pattern of interest in how to detect fraud was not related to the changes in 
discussion of formal standards about fraud detection.  Whatever factor or factors it was that 
drove the two behaviors (discussion of detection techniques and discussion of formal goals), the 
cause(s) must have differed in some way. 
Our present question is whether the business cycles of the century affected these 
variables, and whether it affected goals and techniques differently.  Descriptive data for the six 
measures we used for economic contraction appear in table 2.  Regressing our fraud detection 
variables on these six measures of the presence of an economic contraction, we find that 
economic downturns had no statistically significant relationship to the percent of Montgomery 
text discussing formal fraud detection goals (RESPONSIBLE and 3-POSITIONS) and, thus, we 
do not report any results for those variables. In contrast, however, material concerning fraud 
detection techniques was significantly and positively related to economic downturns (see tables 3 
and 4).6 
                                                
6 Moreover, all six models employ White-heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors.  All the models were run 
using the statistical software package EViews. Note that we have not run “EXPANSION” models. For the 
comparable models where %CONTRACT24 and MAJORITY CONTRACT24 are involved, the EXPANSION 
models would have the opposite signs on the coefficients with everything else remaining the same. 
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Specifically, we find that CONTRACT24 has a modest but highly significant effect on 
HOW TO DETECT.  The presence of a recession within the two years before a volume was 
published explains more than half of the variation (R2 = 54.5%) in the share of the text that 
volume devotes to techniques for discovering fraud.  Similarly, %CONTRACT24 and 
MAJORITY CONTRACT24 explain a substantial amount of the variation (R2 = 43.8% and 30.1% 
respectively) in how much attention fraud detection techniques receive, though MAJORITY 
CONTRACT24 is significant only at the 10% level.7  In short, three different measures suggest 
that economic downturns affected the amount of interest prominent 20th-century auditors had in 
searching for fraud. 
These findings make sense if it is true that the revelation of frauds peak during recessions 
(see literature review above).  It is probably the case that it is harder for a company to conceal 
financial statement fraud in the harsh environment of a recession than in the more forgiving 
climate of economic good times.  Auditors, alarmed by the public outcry which accompanies 
such revelations, would naturally redouble their efforts to discover fraud during a recession.  If 
this loss aversion and associated interest in increasing the chances of discovering material frauds 
were a recent experience when it came time for the leaders of Montgomery’s firm to prepare a 
new edition of the reference manual, that would explain why such practical guidance played a 
bigger role than usual in the text. 
As for our alternate measures of recession, which considered only the 18 months prior to 
the year of publication (see table 3), we find that only CONTRACT18 had a significant effect on 
HOW TO DETECT.  Neither the percent of the 18 months in recession nor the existence of 
                                                
7 A simple test of difference between means of recessionary and non-recessionary periods would give the same 
results as the model in which HOW TO DETECT is regressed against the CONTRACT24 variable.   
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recession for a majority of the period had a clear effect.8  This may be because updates to the 
editions sometimes occurred long before the publication date.  If updates were largely written a 
year or more in advance, then recessions occurring 18 to 24 months before publication would be 
vivid in the writers’ memories.  Measures based on just 18 months would be less likely to 
capture this effect. 
Recall the evidence from prior studies that loss aversion powerfully affects human 
decision making.  Many of these studies specifically find the effect in potential financial loss 
situations.  The tendency of auditors to do more to detect fraud in hard times that we discern in 
the Montgomery series is predictable in light of this human tendency.  Indeed, it may be nearly 
inevitable.  To be fooled by dishonest financial statements causes harm to investors and others.  
This harm is more dangerous and costly in hostile economic environments than in benign ones.  
The investing public, politicians, and courts therefore all demand to find out about such a risk.  
Indeed, the audit has historically developed in large part to satisfy that demand, and it is most 
urgently pressed when the business cycle is in its downswing. 
Auditors are at least as aware of this heightened need for warning during recessions as 
other people are.  Our findings suggest that auditors do, as a practical matter, seek fraud a little 
more diligently in hard times.  This is true even during years when the formal standards have 
downplayed such a goal. 
This fraud-seeking behavior may occur because auditors tend to legitimize their conduct 
during periods of economic downturn.  During downturns, auditors’ roles are frequently 
questioned because there is a perception that “a purpose of audit authorities is to fight fraud” 
(Cooper et al., 2013, p. 441).  Auditors, our evidence suggests, attempt to maintain legitimacy by 
                                                
8 A test of difference between means of recessionary and non-recessionary periods would give the same results as 
the model in which HOW TO DETECT is regressed against the CONTRACT18 variable.   
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changing audit procedures and increasing detection efforts. 
At the same time, auditors’ behavior as documented in this study is consistent with 
prospect decision theory, in that we found auditors were more interested in fraud detection 
during recessions even in the absence of standards requiring such attention.  Apparently, auditors 
were very averse to the possibility of loss, as the theory predicts. 
In contrast, the official audit standards concerning fraud detection exemplify what 
Dickhaut et al. (2010) call “rationally designed” economic institutions.  Audit standards are 
designed at several removes from the fear that drives people in a recession.  The standards 
change only slowly, following extensive interest group maneuvering and bureaucratic 
consideration.  Thus, changes in official goals often will not correspond to the changes in relative 
risk presented by the business cycle.    
 
Conclusion 
To summarize, our study of the pre-eminent U.S. audit practitioners’ guide of the 20th century 
tentatively supports our hypothesis that recessions increase auditors’ attention to fraud detection 
techniques. However, we do not find evidence in the Montgomery series of increased interest in 
formal fraud detection requirements during recessions, a finding we take to be a result of the 
time-consuming bureaucratic process of changing formal standards. Such findings are supportive 
of both prospect decision theory – in that auditors seek to discover fraud more diligently at times 
when failure would be unusually risky to the quality of the audit - and legitimacy theory – in that 
auditors seem to seek most diligently to protect the legitimacy of their work in hard economic 
times when it is under the most serious assault from the public.   
Our findings are limited in several important ways.  First, the Montgomery series can 
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only be taken as evidence of U.S. audit history.  It is an open question whether auditors in other 
countries have pursued the same path as have American auditors.  Secondly, our statistical tests 
did not control for other variables that may have affected auditors’ interest in fraud detection 
techniques.  It is possible that a third variable, which we did not consider, was the real driver of 
changes in this area.  Furthermore, the method – a content analysis of a practitioner’s reference 
series – is an indirect measure of changes in audit practice.  We believe the various editions of 
Montgomery to be a reasonable proxy for auditors’ behavior in the field, but we could be wrong.  
Finally, there were only 12 editions of Montgomery.  Our study is therefore is an example of 
small-sample “private data collection,” a methodology described as fruitful by Chapman (2012, 
pp. 822-823), but one that can only tentatively support a conclusion.  In short, other research 
methods, such as experimentation, might or might not find the same results we did.   
Nevertheless, the study results do have practical implications.  Auditors might do well to 
cultivate their natural tendencies to seek out fraud, especially in recessions.  They could focus a 
little less on the guidance so central to current audit training and standards, such as the 
evaluation of internal controls and the assessment of fraud risk, which do not directly seek fraud.  
Instead, or at least in addition, they could focus a little more on actual procedures that will 
efficiently and directly detect fraud.   
Furthermore, auditors could increase these efforts when an economic boom has been 
going on for a while.  The huge frauds perpetrated near the ends of economic booms herald 
enormous harm that arrives as soon as the ensuing bust begins.  Catching a few more of these 
deceits before the hard times arrive might ameliorate the extent of the damage – and of the 
subsequent losses to audit firms.  
And after all, our findings suggest that despite decades of avoiding, denying, and 
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reluctantly proclaiming fraud detection as one goal of auditing, auditors have long reacted to 
hard times, however grudgingly, by becoming more vigilant in searching for fraud.  Auditors 
might do well to give freer rein to their instinctive aversion to losses – and their natural desire for 
professional legitimacy - when it comes to dealing with the possibility of fraud by their clients. 
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Figure 1.  Percent of text on fraud detection positions, by Montgomery 
edition. 
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Figure 2. Percent of text on how to detect fraud, by Montgomery 
edition. 
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Table 1. Variable descriptions. 
 
Dependent: HOW TO DETECT Percentage of Montgomery text explaining how the 
auditor should go about detecting fraud 
Dependent: RESPONSIBLE Percentage of text asserting a formal fraud detection 
responsibility 
Dependent: 3-POSITIONS Percentage of text asserting, denying, or discussing a 
formal fraud detection responsibility 
Independent: CONTRACT24 Economic decline in any month or months out of the 24 
months prior to the year in which a volume was 
published, dummy variable 
Independent: %CONTRACT24 Percentage of months of economic decline that occurred 
in the 24 months prior to the year in which a volume 
was published 
Independent: MAJORITY CONTRACT24 Economic decline in half or more of 24 months prior to 
year of publication, dummy variable 
Independent: CONTRACT18 Economic decline in any month or months out of the 18 
months prior to the year in which a volume was 
published, dummy variable 
Independent: %CONTRACT18 Percentage of months of economic decline that occurred 
in the 18 months prior to the year in which a volume 
was published 
Independent: MAJORITY CONTRACT18 Economic decline in half or more of 18 months prior to 
year of publication, dummy variable 
 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive data for independent variables measuring economic contractions, in 24-
month and 18-month periods preceding publication of Montgomery editions. 
 
Edition CONTRACT 
24 
%CONTRACT 
24 
MAJORITY 
CONTRACT24 
CONTRACT 
18 
%CONTRACT  
18 
MAJORITY 
CONTRACT 18 
1912 1 95.83% 1 1 100.00% 1 
1916 1 50.00 1 1 33.33 0 
1922 1 75.00 1 1 72.22 1 
1927 1 8.33 0 1 11.11 0 
1934 1 62.50 1 1 50.00 1 
1940 1 25.00 0 0 0.00 0 
1949 1 4.17 0 1 5.56 0 
1957 0 0.00 0 0 0.00 0 
1975 1 54.17 1 1 72.22 1 
1985 0 0.00 0 0 0.00 0 
1990 0 0.00 0 0 0.00 0 
1998 0 0.00 0 0 0.00 0 
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Table 3: Regression models on text in Montgomery editions devoted to techniques for discovering 
fraud regressed on measures of economic downturns over the 24 months preceding 
publication of an edition. 
 
Dependent Variable: HOW TO DETECT 
n = 12 
 
Model 1 
VARIABLES COEFFICIENT ST. ERROR T-STAT SIGNIFICANCE 
INTERCEPT 0.0266 0.0036 7.4010 *** 
CONTRACT24 0.0845 0.0175 4.8194 *** 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
R-SQUARED 0.55 
	   	   	  ADJ. R-SQUARED 0.50 
	   	   	   
Model 2 
 
VARIABLES COEFFICIENT ST. ERROR T-STAT SIGNIFICANCE 
INTERCEPT 0.0493 0.0127 3.8857 *** 
%CONTRACT24 0.1079 0.0281 3.8431 *** 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
R-SQUARED 0.44 
	   	   	  ADJ. R-SQUARED 0.38 
	   	   	   
Model 3 
 
VARIABLES COEFFICIENT ST. ERROR T-STAT SIGNIFICANCE 
INTERCEPT 0.0580 0.0156 3.7068 *** 
MAJORITY CONTRACT24 0.0600 0.0306 1.9612 * 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
R-SQUARED 0.30 
	   	   	  ADJ. R-SQUARED 0.23 
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Table 4: Regression models on text in Montgomery editions devoted to techniques for discovering fraud regressed 
on measures of economic downturns over the 18 months preceding publication of an edition. 
 
Dependent Variable: HOW TO DETECT 
n = 12 
 
Model 4 
 
VARIABLES COEFFICIENT ST. ERROR T-STAT SIGNIFICANCE 
INTERCEPT 0.0454 0.0186 2.4380 ** 
CONTRACT24 0.0644 0.0270 2.3829 ** 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
R-SQUARED 0.35 
	   	   	  ADJ. R-SQUARED 0.28 
	   	   	   
Model 5 
 
VARIABLES COEFFICIENT ST. ERROR T-STAT SIGNIFICANCE 
INTERCEPT 0.0625 0.0163 3.8375 *** 
%CONTRACT24 0.0713 0.0415 1.7169 Insignificant# 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
R-SQUARED 0.21 
	   	   	  ADJ. R-SQUARED 0.13 
	   	   	   
# Significant at 12 percent 
 
Model 6 
 
VARIABLES COEFFICIENT ST. ERROR T-STAT SIGNIFICANCE 
INTERCEPT 0.0713 0.0193 3.6867 *** 
MAJORITY CONTRACT24 0.0350 0.0354 0.9899 Insignificant 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
R-SQUARED 0.09 
	   	   	  ADJ. R-SQUARED 0.00 
	   	   	   
NB:  Significance levels are indicated as follows:  *** - p-value less than 0.01 percent; ** - p-value between 0.01 
and 0.05 percent; * - p-value between 0.05 and 0.1 percent. 
 
 
